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The Good Samaritan in the Chinese Society: Morality vis-à-vis Law 
Abstract 
 
Apathy has become a problem which endangers Chinese society, in part because those 
assisting the injured could be exposed to liabilities. With reference to both law and morality, 
the longstanding issue of “duty to rescue” is explored in the Chinese socio-legal context. It 
remains highly controversial whether it is legitimate or justifiable to impose a legal duty on 
“Good Samaritans” to assist people who are in perilous situations. Reference is also made to 
the legislative response of other major jurisdictions, which are examined and compared 
taking into account their social and legal specificities. A tentative conclusion is provided that 
China should take a pragmatic position: in between harsh civil law jurisdictions, and 
common law jurisdictions (which have traditionally been averse to making moral duties 
actionable legal claims). Arguably, Good Samaritan laws can provide a moral compass that 
directs the public appropriately in assisting people in distress. Law should not only reflect 
society’s moral values; law also has a role to play in reshaping morality in China’s rapidly 
changing society. 
 
Introduction 
In the New Testament, the Good Samaritan parable refers to a man who rescued a victim 
lying on roadside.  Religious officials had ignored the man when they had walked past him.1 
Nowadays, Good Samaritan often denotes a selfless person who rescues another who has 
                                                          
1 New Testament, Luke 10:25-37 
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been harmed. As the world’s second largest economy, China’s total income is expected to 
shoot to £25.5 trillion by 2016.2 However, Chinese morals and mutual trust are eroding; 
there is an absence of Samaritanism. Given the moral crisis in China, a Good Samaritan law 
is a realistic way to enhance public morality, and create a sense of trust. The current law is 
inadequate because a Good Samaritan always faces a difficult decision between inaction on 
the one hand, and the possibility of being sued by the victim on the other. 3  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I analyses a Nanjing Judge’s verdict using the logic that 
the defendant would never have assisted the plaintiff had he not been responsible for the 
victim’s fall in the first place. The foreseeable effects of this questionable judicial precedent 
are discussed with a particular focus on the public’s attitude toward potential rescues in 
similar situations. Part II puts the controversy into context along with a socio-legal and 
cultural analysis, explaining why passers-by are often reluctant to intervene. China is unique 
in the way that morality has influenced legal development throughout history. A variety of 
issues are examined, including the apparent moral vacuum and guanxi. Profound 
differences can be identified which imply that neither common law nor the civil law 
approaches can be translated into the Chinese legislative system. Part III looks into the 
theories which attempt to justify distinctions between civil and common law approaches. 
China’s regional Good Samaritan provision is given detailed discussion, which paves the way 
for China to implement pragmatic legislation. Part IV reviews several competing theories of 
legal philosophy. Whether law could change passers-by’s behaviour is explored but 
                                                          
2 Credit Suisse, ‘Global Wealth Report 2014’ (October 2014) 
<https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=60931FDE-A2D2-F568-
B041B58C5EA591A4> 48 
3 Kevin Williams, ‘Doctors as Good Samaritans: Some Empirical Evidence Concerning Emergency Medical 
Treatment in Britain’ (2003) 30 Journal of  Law & Society 258, 282 
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ultimately left open for further debate. Three viable proposals are put forward to address 
China’s declining morality: the long-standing social safety net, the burden of proof and 
financial incentives. These proposals may be unable to resolve all of the issues which 
prevent Good Samaritans from offering assistance, but may nevertheless provide a 
framework for further discussion. In the final part, a tentative conclusion is given that it is 
more feasible for China to take a middle ground position, in light of its unique socio-legal 
and cultural setting.  
 
I. Xu v Peng (Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court, 2007) 
It is a case about a victim demanding damages from her rescuer. On 20 November 2007, 
Peng was accused of knocking Xu down after he helped the plaintiff by escorting her to the 
hospital.4 Xu sued the defendant for ¥RMB 40,000 (£4000) to cover the medical costs. The 
Nanjing judge made his decision based on common sense, ruling that only the person who 
had hit a plaintiff would take them to the hospital. This set a precedent that discourages 
passers-by from being a Good Samaritan. 
 
1. Peng v Xu-The Plausible Common Sense  
In 2007, Peng was sued after escorting-out of altruism-to the hospital Xu who had broken 
her leg. Although neither party provided sufficient evidence, the judge ordered Peng to pay 
40% of Xu’s medical costs in the first instance. The case highlights the gap between 
controversial judicial decision-making and public perception. Under public pressure, the 
court adjusted its verdict, which resulted in the defendant paying 10% of the costs. In terms 
                                                          
4 Xu v Peng [Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court] 3 September 2007 
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of defendant’s liability, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to eliminate the 
possibility that the defendant had knocked down the plaintiff. The common sense principle 
that the Nanjing judge seems to be advocating is that only guilty parties help the injured. 
 
(a) Only the Guilty Rescues the Injured  
 
The Nanjing judge has improperly relied on personal speculation to determine the 
defendant’s culpability.5  The judge held that Peng would not have helped Xu had he not 
been responsible for her fall. He came to this conclusion because, in his opinion, no one 
would help another person unless they felt guilty. At most, ‘normal’ people would have left 
Xu after escorting her to the hospital, instead of remaining until the surgical check had been 
completed. The Nanjing judge gave the following reasoning: 
“According to sociological reasoning, when the plaintiff's family arrived, he could 
have stated the facts clearly, had the plaintiff's family taken her to the hospital, and 
then departed the scene. But the defendant did not make this choice; his actions are 
conspicuously at odds with reason.”6 
The judge considers financial exchanges between strangers to run contrary to social norms; 
in the judge’s logic, a defendant would only pay medical costs when they had a guilty 
conscience. Peng should not have paid the plaintiff’s medical fee (RMB¥ 200 (£20)) without 
requesting a return. Based on his own common sense and his own life experiences, the 
Nanjing judge inferred that Peng was responsible for the plaintiff’s fall. Thus the burden was 
on Peng to prove his innocence. The current legal systems remain inadequate to protect 
                                                          
5 Melody Young, ‘The Aftermath of Peng Yu: Restoring Helping Behaviour in China’ (2013) 22 Paciﬁc Rim 
Law & Policy Journal 691, 711 at 698 
6 Xu v Peng [Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court] 3 September 2007 
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Good Samaritans when the beneficiary’s accusation proves to be a fabrication. 7 In the 
reported cases to date, there has not been a single judgement in favour of the rescuer.8 The 
overreliance on common sense by the Nanjing judge, demonstrates an indifference towards 
the rule of law, as well as being against progressive values. After all, a genuine commitment 
to fostering altruism requires a favourable legal response.9 Essentially, the judgement 
encourages unsubstantiated claims for monetary damages by using common sense 
presumptions instead of evidence. This is a dangerous position to be in, and it may well lead 
to true offenders going unpunished.10   
 
(b) The Defective Reasoning by Reversing the Burden of Proof  
 
The judge’s reasoning is flawed and illogical because he places the burden of proof on the 
defendant. However, it is well-established that the plaintiff should provide sufficient 
evidence to substantiate their claim, or rebut the defendant’s counterclaim.11 The Nanjing 
judge has reversed the burden of proof requiring the defendant to prove that he is not 
culpable. In tort, presumption of fault is only applied in certain circumstances stipulated by 
law, that is, liability shall be assumed unless the defendant rebuts the accusation.12 Tort law 
does not indicate how Peng’s case should be decided. In this case, the plaintiff should have 
                                                          
7 Adam Minter, ‘China’s Infamous Good Samaritan Case Gets a New Ending’ Bloomberg (17 January 2012) 
8  Yunxiang Yuan, ‘The Good Samaritan’s New Trouble: A Study of the Changing Moral Landscape in 
Contemporary China’ (2009) 17 (1) Social Anthropology 9, 24 at 14 
9 Hanoch Dagan, ‘In Defence of the Good Samaritan’ (1999) 97 (5) Michigan Law Review 1152, 1200, at 1166 
10 Sheng Chao, ‘China Scares Off Good Samaritans’ Economic Observer (2 September 2011)  
11 The Civil Procedural Law (9 April 1991) Article 64; Supreme People’s Court, Some Provisions on Evidence 
in Civil Procedures (6 December 2001) Articles 1, 2 
12 Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China Article 6  
(The Tort Law was adopted at the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s 
Congress on 26 December 2009, and then came into effect on 1 July 2010) 
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had the burden of proving a prima facie case that the defendant was liable.13 As it stands, 
the judicial system emboldens people to chance litigation to cover their medical costs. There 
are numerous precedents where rescuers have been framed by the beneficiary. 
Immediately after Xu v Peng, in a similar case, the defendant, Jundong Wu, was ordered by 
a local court to pay RMB¥70,000 (£7000) in compensation to an elderly couple based on 
Nanjing judge’s reasoning.14 Despite the lack of evidence, the court held that Wu would not 
have taken the couple to the hospital had he not been at fault. These cases show that 
injured parties can falsely accuse Good Samaritans as a means of recovering monetary 
damages. The above cases have diminished the public’s trust in the judicial system which 
harms the sanctity of law. It has also had a profound effect on Chinese moral standards; 
people are increasingly hesitant to render assistance when strangers need help.15  
 
2. Chilling Effects on Good Samaritan  
 
The ruling in Xu v Peng not only causes the judicial system to lose credibility but also 
constitutes a heavy blow to social trust and the principle of moral reciprocity.16 Much worse, 
the case has had a particularly negative impact on attitudes towards civic duties. The 
defective reasoning underpinning the verdict in Xu v Peng has led to a chilling effect on the 
willingness of people to act as a Good Samaritan. A dilemma frequently arises when passers-
                                                          
13 Mengyun Tang, ‘Does China Need Good Samaritan Laws to Save Yue Yue?’ (2014) 47 (1) Cornell 
International Law Journal 205, 231 at 222 
14 Jundong Wu v Hu &Dai (Zhejiang Jinhua Intermediate People’s Court, 2011) 
15 Melody Young, ‘The Aftermath of Peng Yu: Restoring Helping Behaviour in China’ (2013) 22 Paciﬁc Rim 
Law & Policy Journal 691, 711 at 701 
16 ‘The Unkindness of Strangers’ The Economist (27 July 2013) 
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by attempt to assist people in need.17 Rescuing strangers can be risky. Most passers-by are 
increasingly concerned that victims can extort money from them if they try to help. As a 
result, passers-by use these legal rulings to justify ignoring victims who are in need of 
assistance. This has led to a decline in Chinese moral standards. The chilling effect is 
reflected from some online surveys by various institutions below. 
Surveyors Willing to Help Ignore Conditional Help 
Hong Kong-based 
Phoenix Television18 
(20,000 participants) 
22 May 2012 
≤7% ≥45% 43% would help only 
 if there was a camera. 
 
China Youth Daily19 
(139,010 participants)  
13 December 2013 
5.4% 55.6% 23.4% would offer help  
after finding a witness;  
12.6% would call police. 
 
Sina Weibo20 
(China’s premier blog) 
20 December 2013 
20% 43%  38% undecided or unsure 
 
The majority of participants would ignore the victim and leave straight away, while only a 
small proportion of participants would be willing to help without hesitation. The 2016 World 
Giving Index revealed that only 24% of Chinese respondents said they had helped a stranger 
in the past month, which was ranked the last.21 The primary excuse for not helping is a fear 
of legal action. The survey may not identify apathy as the sole reason for such behaviour, 
but may also show that the participants do not trust the Chinese judicial system to give fair 
                                                          
17 James Buchanan, ‘The Samaritan’s Dilemma’ in Edmund Prelim, (ed.) Altruism, Morality and Economic 
Theory (New York: Russell Sage, 1975) 71-85 
18 http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_05/22/14708059_0.shtml 
19 China Youth Daily (10 December 2013)  
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-12/10/nw.D110000zgqnb_20131210_2-07.htm. 
20 http://huati.weibo.com/zt/s?k=9739&hasori=1 
21 Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), ‘World Giving Index 2016’  
https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/2016-publications/caf-world-giving-index-2016 
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judgments.22 Nonetheless selfishness and apathy has resulted in the tragic death of double 
hit-and-run victim. On 13 October 2011, Yue Wang, a two-year old child was run over by 
two trucks during the course of 17 minutes in Guangdong; 18 people passed by the fatally-
injured child.23 The tragedy symbolises the country’s moral decline:24 apathy is antithetical 
to a harmonious society. Wang’s death has highlighted that China is a conflicted nation. 
China predominately prides itself on huge economic success, but the Wang accident shows 
that the nation’s civic consciousness and moral awareness to be lacking.  It is imperative 
that people look into the reasons behind this societal apathy. 
 
II. The In-depth Rationale behind the Irregular Social Phenomenon  
Passers-by tend to take a calculated approach when faced with the moral decision of 
helping a stranger.25 It should be a simplest case of doing the right thing; however, decisions 
to rescue now resembles cost-benefit analysis and rational self-interest. It is not accurate to 
say that Chinese citizens are intrinsically selfish. There are a myriad of factors that 
contribute to the current state of affairs. 
 
1. The Moral Vacuum  
Contemporary Chinese society lacks a coherent moral narrative, and the country is 
becoming increasingly indifferent with rampant economic growth. As the second largest 
                                                          
22 Melody Young, ‘The Aftermath of Peng Yu: Restoring Helping Behaviour in China’ (2013) 22 Paciﬁc Rim 
Law & Policy Journal 691, 711 at 704 
23 Zhong Wu, ‘Little Yueyue and China’s Moral Road’ Asian Times (19 October 2011); ‘Outcry in China over 
Hit-and-Run Toddler Left in Street’ BBC News (17 October 2011) 
24 Bolin He, ‘Debate: Yue Yue’ China Daily (24 October 2011) 
25 Man Yee Karen Lee, ‘The Role of Law in Addressing the Good Samaritan’s Dilemma: A Chinese Model?’ 
(2015) 2 (1) Asian Journal of Law and Society 55, 92 at 68 
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economy, China is undergoing rapid transformation but without clear sense of direction. In 
such a transforming society, there has been a shift from the sombreness of communism to 
consumerist hedonism.26 It is argued that the country has got lost in a deadly moral 
vacuum.27 The Cultural Revolution has destroyed Chinese traditional moral standards. 
Nearly all of the tradition values were discarded to make way for Mao, the former president 
of China.28 The lack of a well-established value system is deepening China’s moral crisis.29 
The materialistic pursuit of fortune has replaced traditional altruism and civility, and, as yet, 
there is no clear alternative. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did advocate communal 
altruism, exemplified by the slogan of “Serve the People”.30 It remains dubious as to 
whether they really did “serve the people”. In the early 1980s, the slogan was replaced by a 
new mantra of “Pursue Wealth”, at any expense. The primacy of materialism and pursuit of 
self-interest can result in extreme antisocial behaviour. This new campaign has brought 
about accelerated economic development during the last four decades, which has 
nevertheless created a moral vacuum. It celebrates material wealth without limitation, for 
example “To get rich is glorious”.31 As such, there is a moral void emerging from China’s 
materialist approach, which causes civic responsibility to be in decline.  
 
                                                          
26 Yunxiang Yuan, ‘The Good Samaritan’s New Trouble: A Study of the Changing Moral Landscape in 
Contemporary China’ (2009) 17 (1) Social Anthropology 9, 24 
27 Peter Simpson, ‘Is this the little girl who taught compassion to China?’ Mail (21 October 2011) 
28 Jiwei Ci, ‘The Moral Crisis in Post-Mao China: Prolegomenon to a Philosophical Analysis’ (2009) 56 (1) 
Diogenes 19, 25 
29 Lijia Zhang, ‘How can I be proud of my China if we are a nation of 1.4 bn cold hearts?’ Guardian (22 
October 2011)  
30 Hannah Song and Yifan Zhang, ‘Wang Yue-Is this a sensationalist story or an example of Chinese attitudes?’  
<http://hardboiled.berkeley.edu/archived-issues/year-15/issue-15-2/wang-yue/> 
31 Clifford Coonan, ‘Has China lost its humanity?’ The Independent (22 October 2011) 
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Is the rapid march to materialism to blame for the nation’s moral bankruptcy? Notably, it is 
Marxism with materialism at its theoretical core.32 Inherently constrained by societal 
hierarchies, people in China do not expect leniency, justice or even rationality from those 
with power. This perception is related to the prevailing unwillingness to assist others in 
perilous situations. It can be argued that China has imported free market economics from 
the West without importing the corresponding ethics.33 With Chinese traditional moral 
principles diminishing, a moral vacuum has come into being. Such a vacuum cannot be filled 
by the free market economics alone. Wealth maximisation and the free market economic 
model needs a strong moral system to ensure that injustices do not materialise. 
 
2. Guanxi (Network of Personal Relationships) 
 
A proverb in China says that “Each person should sweep the snow on his own doorsteps and 
should not fret about those on his neighbours”. Chinese people are so concerned with being 
part of a network of personal relationships that that affects nearly everyone, and strangers 
are supposed to “mind their own business”.34 This way of thinking is based on the duty to 
protect one’s family and those within guanxi, which may help to explain the uniquely 
egocentric social structures in Chinese society.35 It is noted that:  
“Society is made up of many circles each comprising a “self,” whose connections in 
turn forms a web of personal relations. One accorded a certain degree of treatment 
                                                          
32 Francis Mulhern, Contemporary Marxist Literary Criticism (Routledge, 2014) 22-27 
33 Lijia Zhang, ‘How can I be proud of my China if we are a nation of 1.4 bn cold hearts?’ Guardian (22 
October 2011) 
34 Stanley Lubman, ‘After the Foshan Tragedy: China’s Good Samaritan Debate’ The Wall Street Journal (9 
December 2011)  
35 Xiaotong Fei, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992) 61 
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to another commensurate with their relationship, the so-called “difference between 
those who are close and those who are distant.”36 
The last sentence of the above resonates with that of guanxi,37 which the Chinese rely to 
“get things done”.38 Seen as “super law” but with little regard to law, guanxi is merely “a 
strategically constructed network of personal connections” based on “instrumental 
exchanges of favours.39 This inherently divides people into those within guanxi and those 
beyond the network of interpersonal relations. In this vein, guanxi constrains Chinese 
society by fixing the social order, within which people pursue their instrumental ends 
reciprocally.40  These inherent norms play an indispensable role in maintaining moral 
obligations.  By the same token, outsiders do not share any of the privileges which arise out 
of guanxi. This may be one of the reasons why Chinese people treat strangers with seeming 
indifference. It is the absence of guanxi that is used to justify inaction when injured 
strangers need help. This hypothetical is also argued that “China’s traumatic years under 
Mao Zedong only reinforced the instinct”.41 As Smith observed in 1894, “Unwillingness to 
help others is a trait that runs through Chinese social relations in multi-fold 
manifestations”.42 This observation, to some extent, reinforces that China needs to cultivate 
trust beyond guanxi. 
 
                                                          
36 Xiaotong Fei, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992) 67 
37 Man Yee Karen Lee, ‘The Role of Law in Addressing the Good Samaritan’s Dilemma: A Chinese Model?’ 
(2015) 2 (1) Asian Journal of Law and Society 55, 92 at 65 
38 Alan Smart, ‘Expressions of Interest: Friendship and guanxi in Chinese Societies’ in Sandra Bell & Simon 
Coleman (eds.) The Anthropology of Friendship (Oxford & New York: Berg, 1999) 119–136 at 120 
39 Yunxiang Yan, ‘The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village’ (1996) 35 China Journal 1, 25 at 3-4 
40 Yunxiang Yan, ‘The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village’ (1996) 35 China Journal 1, 25 
41 ‘The Unkindness of Strangers’ The Economist (27 July 2013) 
42Arthur Smith, Chinese Characteristics (Simon Publications LLC, 2001) 194-218 
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Another factor worthy of note is urbanisation and largescale migration has altered the way 
in which Chinese people interact with others. Urban citizens rarely have strong connections 
anymore, whereas, in the past, rural residents had a strong sense of community. 43 In small 
rural communities people needed to rely on each other to survive, while society in the 21st 
century relies on self-perseverance.44 Guanxi could be used as a positive influence to unify 
society, but does not change the fundamental ecology of the modern society.45 Due to the 
rapid transformation resulting from the increasing urbanisation, the conventional guanxi 
has steadily declined. Hundreds of millions of peasants are migrating to cities; these cities 
are turning into communities of strangers. The moral ideal of having harmonious 
communities does not fit the new social, legal, and cultural landscape.46 The previous 
relationship could be characterised by intimacy, trust and interdependence; while urban 
society is characterised by estrangement, distrust and independence.47 Urbanisation and 
the mixing of communities (catalysed by migration) reinforces the reluctance of 
communities to engage with strangers outside of their immediate social order. 
 
It is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of the factors that contribute to people’s apathy 
and indifference in contemporary Chinese society. For instance, overwhelming levels of 
corruption does not encourage the public to maintain high moral standards. Corruption 
weakens the government’s moral authority. By the same token, these moral narratives are 
                                                          
43 Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton University Press, 
1993) 28 
44 Kate Hutchings and Georgina Murray, ‘Working with Guanxi: An Assessment of the Implications of 
Globalisation on Business Networking in China’ (2002) 11 (3) Creativity and Innovation Management 184, 191 
45 Jane Nolan, ‘Guanxi’ Oxford Bibliographies (28 July 2015) 
46 Philip Huang, Chinese Civil Justice, Past and Present (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) Chapters 2, 7 
47 Jaime FlorCruz, ‘China Soul-Searching after Toddler's Death’ CNN (22 October 2011) 
13 
 
not openly acknowledged because the makers’ legitimacy is not well-justified.48 Injustice 
resulting from officialdom can encourage citizens to use immoral means for self-gain.49 
Political and legal corruption deters the public from offering their kindness to other people, 
especially to strangers. As a consequence, peoples are driven by materialism – resentment 
permeates and endangers the moral legitimacy of the whole society.50  
 
III. The Good Samaritan Law: A Comparative Perspective 
Law can be conceptualised as coerced compliance, representing the bottom line; a person 
can be punished legitimately for failing to meet this minimum standard.51 One school of 
thought held by Max Weber is that law should be purely “formal-rational” unified by legal 
logic into a consistent whole, and free from the influence of external moral values.52 This 
seems to imply a clear dichotomy between legal and moral duties. It seems that juxtaposing 
law and morality in this way produces too narrow a view of rationality.53 The issues of law 
and morality which relate to the Good Samaritan have long been the subject of legislation in 
the West, where legal systems address them in diverging ways.54 Civil law countries have 
placed a legal obligation on passers-by. Controversial as it is, the law in these countries has 
created a legal duty to rescue; the law also provides legal protection to Good Samaritans to 
                                                          
48 Ling Li, ‘Performing Bribery in China: Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with A Human Face’ (2011) 20 (1) 
Journal of Contemporary China 1, 20 
49 Jiong Tu, ‘On the moral void in contemporary China’ Kings Review (22 May 2014)  
<http://kingsreview.co.uk/magazine/blog/2014/05/22/on-the-moral-void-in-contemporary-china/> 
50 Baogang Guo, ‘Political Legitimacy and China’s Transition’ (2003) 8 (1) Journal of Chinese Political Science 
1, 25 
51 Jason Brennan, ‘Beyond the Bottom Line: the Theoretical Aims of Moral Theorising’ (2008) 28 (2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 277, 296 
52  Stephen Kalberg, ‘Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization 
Processes in History’ (1980) 85 (5) The American Journal of Sociology 1145, 1179 at 1165-66 
53 Mathieu Deflem, Sociology of Law Visions of a Scholarly Tradition (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2008) 37-55 
54 John Pardun, ‘Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective’ (1998) 20 Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Journal 591, 593 
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avoid unjust results.55 In contrast, common law jurisdictions have been traditionally averse 
to imposing a legal duty to rescue.56 This can be attributed to the fact that individualism is 
valued to a greater extent in common law jurisdictions.57 China’s legal system seems unable 
to respond these issues. And, given China’s rapidly changing society, it may be practicable to 
introduce a legal duty to rescue by way of a Good Samaritan law. 
 
1. Good Samaritan in Civil Law Jurisdictions  
In the civil law jurisdictions, the duty to rescue is normally considered to be legitimate.58 
Civil law countries have tended to either create a duty to rescue, which punishes those who 
fail to render assistance, or introduce legislation to shield rescuers from liability.59 In France, 
the statute governing the duty to rescue imposes criminal and civil liability when a passer-by 
fails to render necessary help, and there is no risk to himself or a third party.60 It provides 
that: 
“A person must assist anyone in jeopardy, unless there is reasonable evidence that it 
would cause danger to himself or a third party. Abstaining from rendering assistance 
constitutes an offence, which may result in up to five years imprisonment and a fine 
of up to €75,000.”61 
                                                          
55Samuel Freeman, ‘Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed’ (1994) 142 (5) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1455, 1492 
56 Eric Grush, ‘Inefficiency of the No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule and a Proposed Similar Risk Alternative’ (1998) 
146 (3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 881, 900 
57 Robert Justin Lipkin, ‘Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the 
General Legal Duty to Rescue’ (1983) 31 UCLA Law Review 252, 293 at 276 
58 Martin Vranken, ‘Duty to Rescue in Civil Law and Common Law: Les Extremes Se Touchent’ (1998) 47 (4) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 934, 942 
59 Marc Franklin, ‘Vermont Requires Rescue’ (1972) 25 Stanford Law Review 51, 59 
60Saul Levmore, ‘Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of 
Affirmative Obligations’ (1986) 72 Virginia Law Review 913, 917 
61 French Criminal Code Article 223-6 [2] 
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The duty-to-rescue provision treats the offence as pure omission.62 People that witness a 
person in peril and do not render assistance can be arrested for inaction. The French legal 
philosophy is that a witness is considered to be an integral participant to the crime, even in 
the case of nonfeasance.63 French courts determine damages by assessing what harm could 
have been avoided, had a reasonable rescuer rendered assistance.64 Similarly in Germany, 
under the clause of “Failure to Render Assistance”: whoever does not render assistance 
shall be punished with up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine, when he could have helped 
without imposing risk to himself or third parties.65 The similar approach goes to the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which creates a duty to rescue when a life is in peril 
unless such action involves danger to the rescuer.66 In contrast, common law jurisdictions do 
not transform moral duties into legal duties, where moral acts are not legally enforced in 
principle.67 
 
2. Good Samaritan in Common Law Jurisdictions  
 
The common law position holds that the Good Samaritan predicament is purely one of 
individual empathy, not one of legislative importance.68 For instance, the UK does not have 
                                                          
62 John Kleinig, ‘Criminal Liability for Failures to Act’ (1986) 49 (3) Law and Contemporary Problems 161, 
180 
63 Edward Tomlinson, ‘The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: a Dubious Case for Criminal Enforcement’ 
(2000) 20 New York Law School Law Review 451 
64 Jennifer Groninger, ‘No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What is 
Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated?’ (1999) 26 Pepperdine Law Review 353, 371 at 354 
65 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], §323c (Germany) 
66 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms s2 
67 Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Duty to Rescue in Contract Law’ (2002) 71 (3) Fordham Law Review 647; Ernest 
Weinrib, ‘The Case for a Duty to Rescue’ (1980) 90 Yale Law Journal 247 
68 Lynne Henderson, ‘Legality and Empathy’ (1987) 85 Michigan Law Review 1579, 1582; Norval Morris, 
‘Compensation and the Good Samaritan’ in James Ratcliffe (ed.) The Good Samaritan and the Law (Anchor 
Books, 1966) 135 
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a duty-to-rescue statute.69 In Dorset Yacht Company v Home Ofﬁce, Lord Reid expounded 
the common duty: 
“When a person has done nothing to put himself in any relationship with another 
person in distress or with his property mere accidental propinquity does not require 
him to go to that person’s assistance. There may be a moral duty to do so, but it is 
not practicable to make it a legal duty.”70  
Confirming this stance, Lord Nicholls held in Stovin v Wise that: “The recognised legal 
position is that the bystander does not owe the drowning child or the heedless pedestrian a 
duty to take steps to save him.”71 Inaction does not incur liability per se, unless the parties 
are either within contractual or tortious relationships, or other recognised circumstances 
which give rise a duty to act.72 There is a general absence of a Good Samaritan law in the US. 
To supersede the general common law absence of a duty to rescue, a minority of states 
have created a legal duty to rescue another in an emergency.73 For instance, the Duty to Aid 
the Endangered Act enacted by Vermont in 1967 provides that:  
“A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the 
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without 
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.”74 
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Compared with the French legislation, the common law approaches to Good Samaritans 
appears to be lenient. Regardless of the statutes in place, they are hardly enforced, and the 
practical effect remains minimal.75 As Stewart observed, the statutes imposing a duty to 
rescue in the US “are examples of law easily made but not enforced with any degree of 
regularity or consistency.”76 Such an approach seems to suggest that Good Samaritan laws 
are largely of symbolic importance in the US.77 Even so, the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 
US embodies a policy designed to encourage people to do good within the society.78 A Good 
Samaritan is generally shielded from liability, unless his attempt to rescue another is 
considered to be grossly negligent.79 This mirrors Ontario’s Good Samaritans Act 2001, 
which removes liability for damages caused by negligence of the rescuer except in cases of 
gross negligence.80 With reasonable care and skill, rescuers do not need to worry about legal 
action being taken against them. 
 
3. The Feasibility of Creating a Good Samaritan Law in China: The Shenzhen Provision  
 
As one of the most advanced Special Economic Zones in China, Shenzhen has introduced its 
regional Good Samaritan law, i.e. the Shenzhen Provision on Good Samaritan, which became 
effective on 1 August 2013.81 The Shenzhen Provision provides substantial support to 
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rescuers who render emergency assistance in good faith.82 The plaintiff shall bear the 
burden of proving that his injury has been caused by the Good Samaritan.83 Specifically, the 
plaintiff needs to present a prima facie case; if the plaintiff cannot do so he will be subject 
to administrative or even criminal penalties where a case has been fabricated mala fide.84 
Good Samaritans have the right to require apologies and/or compensation, restoration of 
reputation and other damages if the plaintiff violates Article 6 of the Provision. 85 
Furthermore, witnesses will be rewarded by relevant authorities if they give a testimony on 
behalf of the Good Samaritan.86 Last but not least, Good Samaritans will receive legal advice 
to ensure that they are adequately represented.87 The Shenzhen Provision provides various 
levels of immunity to prevent rescuers from incurring liability. It is designed to incentivise 
people to help others by shielding them from lawsuits. This has the potential to reshape 
attitudes towards morality in China.88 
 
The legislative intent behind the Shenzhen Provision perfectly accords with Honoré’s 
thoughts, that the law should not only reflect public opinion but also actively encourage 
better behaviour.89 He further argues that if the law does not encourage people to rescue 
others, it is sure to discourage it. If it does not compensate, it will indirectly penalise. If the 
rescuer who suffers injury or incurs expense goes without compensation, the law, so far as it 
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inﬂuences conduct at all, is discouraging rescue.90 The Shenzhen Provision does not intend 
to penalise passers-by for failure to render assistance. Rather, it attempts to impose legal 
liability on the rescued to deter disingenuous, fabricated cases. The media, under the 
current social setting, sends the message that Good Samaritans are likely to be extorted by 
the injured. Given the politics of the situation, regional law addresses these serious 
concerns innovatively through incentivising the public to rescue those in distress, rather 
than compelling them to do so. Significantly, the Shenzhen Provision requires plaintiffs to 
provide adequate evidence to prove that the defendant is at fault. It also provides a 
financial incentive to render assistance by allowing Good Samaritans to claim compensation 
for their losses borne out of the rescue. This measure would allay the fears of those who 
hesitate to help because of potential financial losses. Finally, fear of retaliation accounts for 
some failures to intervene.91 The Shenzhen Provision responds by offering financial rewards 
to those who speak out. This will improve evidential procedures, and help to ensure 
substantive justice at trials.  
 
Although law may not fully enforce morals, it does serve as a moral compass.92 The 
Shenzhen Provision implies that Good Samaritans will be appreciated, which encourages 
people to render timely assistance. It sends a clear message that Good Samaritans will not 
be subject to unexpected risks. To an extent, it strikes a fair balance. The Shenzhen Provision 
is also less punitive and coercive than several major civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany 
and France. Chinese traditional philosophy and Confucianism holds that one should be a 
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Good Samaritan purely because of one’s own justice and righteousness.93 In terms of 
jurisprudence, the essence of the Shenzhen Provision is consistent with China’s Criminal Law: 
an individual is not punished for inaction to render assistance. The support-oriented 
approach, instead of punishment, is conducive to preserving personal liberty and fostering 
the culture of altruism.94 Regional law will hopefully strengthen the moral imperative to 
rescue. For the sake of certainty and predictability, an effective law must define clearly what 
actions will be protected. Otherwise, a lack of clarity and details may ultimately hinder its 
efficiency and enforceability. This proves to be a pragmatic value given China’s tradition of a 
civil law system. It does not follow that flexibility, contrary to fixity, has no its judicial value 
with particular regard to complex issues. The People’s Court will benefit from the flexibility 
to exercise their discretion, and can make their decisions on an ad hoc basis, depending on 
the facts before them.  
 
4. The Imposition of a Legal Duty to Rescue: The Balance Between Carrots and Sticks 
 
A middle ground should be sought between unfettered liability and no liability. 95 
Individualism represents an underlying social value which is embedded in the common 
law.96 Another explanation is that the absence of a legal duty to rescue is due largely to the 
common law’s inherent ability to adapt to the changing needs of society.97 In contemporary 
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Chinese society, it is time to create a legal duty to rescue that encourages Good Samaritans 
to intervene, in turn promoting better moral standards. As Lipkin observed: 
“A person has a legal duty to rescue another when he encounters or witnesses that  
person in an emergency situation, in danger of grave physical harm or death, and the 
rescuer has the ability to extenuate the victim from the dangerous circumstances 
without endangering himself or third parties.”98 
Given China’s plausible moral orthodoxy, it would be more practical for the proposed 
legislation to strike a balance between harsh civil law and common law positions. By placing 
civic duties on a legislative footing, the proposed law shows the public's disapproval for bad 
Samaritanism.99 There are predictable ways in which morality can be placed within the 
legislative framework, which can be identified without much knowledge of a country’s 
cultural norms or sociological features.100 It is sufficient to use fines or the threat of civil 
liability. Criminal liability need not always be imposed and occasional judgments against 
non-rescuers may, like a rule of partial liability, be severe enough to stimulate greater 
assistance in emergency situations.101 
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IV. Addressing the Challenge of Law’s Legacy vis-à-vis Morality 
1. Would law change the behaviour of Chinese citizens? 
In light of the long-standing divergent approaches across jurisdictions, it is beneficial for 
China to learn from other countries’ experiences before having its own national Good 
Samaritan Law. It is sensible to look into historical classical debates on law and morality.102 
This enquiry may reveal the pros and cons of the matter, thereby helping us to ascertain 
whether a Good Samaritan Law would be a panacea for the moral challenges faced by 
contemporary Chinese society.  
 
(a) The Debate against Codifying Morality into Law  
 
There is in fact a distinction between law and morality. Assisting people in distress is 
conventionally considered a moral duty, which should not be enforced in the judicial 
realm.103 McFaland has observed that it is wrong to use law to enforce morality in order to 
coerce people into being benevolent.104 Law represents a bottom line crossing which people 
will be punished, whereas morality establishes a higher behavioural standard. Sir Wolfenden 
held that: “there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief 
and crude terms, not the law’s business.”105 People should enjoy a private moral sphere that 
is free from forcible human interference.106 Using law to settle purely moral matters may 
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lessen morality’s importance as a distinct field of inquiry. It could risk depriving individuals 
of their liberty and personal autonomy.107 Imposing a duty to rescue can be viewed as 
implicitly rejecting the primacy of individual rights.108 The law's coercive interference in 
people's lives might even have a counterproductive impact, thus undermining the 
potentially transformative function of such a law.109 Alternatively, it is worth exploring the 
deep-rooted reasons that lead to apathy, and designing a mechanism to incentivise people 
to render assistance in case of emergency. In addition, coercive law may have unexpected 
side effects.110 The case of Xu v Peng shows the low quality of the Nanjing judge’s reasoning, 
which epitomises the Chinese juridical status quo. It seems unfair to compel passers-by to 
render assistance when, as things stand, their legal rights are not adequately protected. 
Imposing a legal duty to rescue in such circumstances will only hinder altruism.111   
 
(b) The Debate for Legalising Good Samaritans  
 
Hard law and moral norms often interact with each other in a symbiotic manner.112 Hart has 
observed that: “there may be grounds justifying the legal coercion of the individual other 
than the prevention of harm to others.”113 In an endorsement of Hart, Devlin argued that:  
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“It is not possible to settle in advance exceptions to the general rule or to deﬁne 
inﬂexibly areas of morality into which the law is in no circumstances to be allowed to 
enter”.114  
Feinberg even held that: “requiring people to help prevent harms is sometimes as 
reasonable a legal policy as preventing people, by threat of punishment, from actively 
causing harms.”115 Law and morality can complement each other. Coercing an individual to 
abide by the law may make him more moral.116 However this will only be the case when law 
and morality are not in conflict, but are instead consistent both in form and substance. In 
essence, Good Samaritan legalisation can be justified by harm prevention and the aim of 
achieving a minimum level of decency.117 Regardless of the above mentioned concerns, 
side-effects are an inevitable cost when using law to coerce people to rescue the injured.118 
Despite restricting individual liberties, a legal duty to rescue would be permissible as it 
furthers the public good, which is superior to the rights of particular persons.119 After all, 
personal liberty and altruism are not always antagonistic to one another, which is a 
prevalent misconception.120  
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Changing social conditions leads to the recognition of new duties,121 which is reinforced by 
China’s unprecedented urban transformation. Precedents often go against the Good 
Samaritan, which makes people reluctant to help for fear of legal consequences. Since a 
Good Samaritan is always left in a vulnerable position, law that protects rescuers would 
serve a useful social purpose, indirectly filling the moral vacuum and increasing people’s 
awareness.122 With specific regard to the case of Yue Wang, where the passers-by’s 
behaviour has failed to meet a minimum standard of decency, legal intervention in the 
moral realm appears particularly well-justified.123 Another point worthy of note is that the 
value of law lies primarily in enhancing awareness rather than punishing people.124 The core 
value of law is not that it reflects mainstream morals, but rather that it actively advocates 
better behaviour. The long-term goal of achieving incremental normative progression 
counts for more than any immediate effects.125 In the above case of Yue Wang, the 
bystander refused to render even minimal help in a dire emergency, and went 
unpunished.126 There are no legal grounds to compel their assistance. Admittedly, a Good 
Samaritan law may be insufficient to improve the public’s moral standard, but may instead 
lead to imperceptible changes in people’s behaviour.127 More subtly, law may contribute to 
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building trust beyond guanxi.128 Furthermore, civil society will play an increasingly pivotal 
role in fostering a culture for Good Samaritans,129 in which the proposed Good Samaritan 
laws will increase the likelihood of people offering assistance when needed.130 
 
2. Addressing Current Challenges 
Few people would risk being a Good Samaritan unless their own rights were adequately 
protected. Even if a Good Samaritan law were in place, it is still uncertain as to whether law 
can grant full immunity to an innocent rescuer. This is largely because the dispute often 
concerns whether an individual has rescued the injured party or caused the injury in the first 
place. The underlying problem thus turns on fraud; it all comes down to the availability of 
facts and the credibility of the witness.131 An imperfect solution would be to find a witness 
before assisting a stranger.132 In order to provide a strong incentive, however, it is argued 
that a system of rewards would encourage potential benefactors to render necessary 
assistance. Aside from the above proposals, it is worth exploring more far-reaching 
resolutions which address the core of the issues.  
 
(a) Upgrade the Social Safety Net  
The fraudulent litigation culture has, in part, been created by a lack of social welfare in 
China, where the injured party cannot afford medical treatment. It is estimated by China’s 
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National Bureau of Statistics that the government can only fund 1.6% of 200 million people 
over the age of 60 in need of care. This coverage is far below the World Bank’s Standard of 
8%.133 The inability to pay for expensive medical treatment means that many of the injured 
lack any access to medical services.134 Desperation forces some injured people to use 
whatever means to protect themselves. They are likely to accuse whoever they can get her 
hands on.135 It is no wonder that there have been so many cases involving extortion. 
Affordable medical care would substantially help to reduce such social ills: the so-called 
“returning kindness with ingratitude”.136  
 
(b) Create the “Presumption of Innocence” 
 
Justice is the primary value of the evidence system.137 The case study of Xu v Peng highlights 
an irrational judgment, contrary to justice, where the Good Samaritan bears the burden of 
proving their innocence. They will be held liable unless they adduce evidence to discharge 
the burden.138 Securing evidence would minimise the chances of a disingenuous claim 
succeeding at trial. Potential Good Samaritans could canvass for witnesses to establish a 
priori that they are not responsible for the injury of an injured person.139 In August 2011, an 
81-year-old woman accused a bus driver of knocking her down. The driver was ultimately 
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exonerated by video footage from a camera installed on the bus itself.140 The video 
surveillance footage showed that a Pedi-cab hit her and the bus driver was there to help.141 
Gathering as much evidence as possible, via increased surveillance, would help to resolve 
some of the fundamental issues. From the above survey by the Hong Kong-based Phoenix 
Television, it appears that people would only consider rescuing an injured person if there 
was a camera. Recording the rescue would also avoid expensive lawsuits. In September 
2011, the Ministry of Health issued the Technical Guidelines on Intervention for Good 
Samaritans. It may, however, be inappropriate for public authorities to instruct the public 
on whether to render assistance. When trying to help others, people who act altruistically 
are not driven by the benefit that they are gaining for themselves. 142 Ideally, it is an 
instinctive and natural response to help another human being who is suffering. It is now 
governed by legislation, which, in some ways, encourages the public to act on the basis of 
cost-benefit analysis.  
 
(c) The Reward-Oriented Model  
 
 Altruists may be motivated by a willingness to do the right thing, or by instrumentalist 
concerns. Helping others in need can provide people with the immediate gratification of 
emotional fulfilment, material pleasure and self-realisation. 143  As Landes and Posner 
observed: “a rescuer may be motivated by altruism or by the possibility of being regarded as 
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a hero, and that legal inducements can impede this motivation.”144 Monroe also noted that: 
“We do good because that is what makes us human, fully and richly human, and not just 
greedy and graspingly self-centred." 145 This school of thought supports the notion that 
incentivising people with rewards distorts social and moral values.146 However, it is equally 
common for legislators to accomplish their goals through creating a fear of sanctions and 
rewarding good behaviour.147 In order to have substantive effect, the legal system should 
encourage socially positive behaviour. Rewards are powerful external motivators for 
altruistic acts. With particular regard to China’s current overwhelming apathy and 
indifference, the absence of carrots militates against strangers helping each other.148 
Rewarding Good Samaritans would reinforce such motivations by providing a bonus, for 
example, a financial incentive. Rewards can serve as an instrument for encouraging 
potential Good Samaritans to render timely assistance. Promoting intervention would be 
justified because it is in the public interest:  ensuring that rescues indeed take place.149 
 
3. A Suggested Guideline for Good Samaritan Law in China  
 
Based on the above analysis, the remedies provided to rescuers is protection normally from 
civil suit by the person assisted. First, the Good Samaritan Law shall protect those rescuers 
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who act in good faith. It is a reasonable behaviour that falls within the ambit of the 
proposed law. The concept is generally defined to be a behaviour that a hypothetical person 
with similar qualification would reasonably consider appropriate to do in a similar 
circumstance.150 Reasonable behaviour should be interpreted broadly, including whether it 
is compatible with the overall societal expectation. Such a legislative intent is well embodied 
in both common law and civil law systems.151 In case of gross negligence but with bona fide, 
leniency should be considered to mitigate potential penalty against the rescuer. Second, the 
rescuer shall be subject to primarily civil liability if necessary, whereas criminal liability can 
only be triggered in an extreme mala fide case. Put differently, the criminal liability should 
play a deterrent role to a greater extent. Last but not least, the law should serve primarily as 
a leverage between action and inaction in the transitional period of China’s transformation. 
As discussed under the sub-heading 4 of Part III, the middle-ground position should lie 
between the French and British models. The legislative intent is to be manifested with the 
support of other complementing mechanisms, such as the reward-oriented model and self-
protection measures. The recent Shanghai Good Samaritan Law reflects a prudent approach. 
The new law encourages people to become “Good Samaritans” by granting legal immunity 
even if their efforts result in harm. A precondition is that citizens should first call Emergency 
Hotline 120, and then carry out first aid but only under the guidance of emergency 
operators.152 Equivalently, Beijing Good Samaritan Law provides that citizens shall provide 
                                                          
150 Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers. Dublin: Law Reform Commission, 2009)  
A number of factors courts should consider in determining whether a particular rescuer’s behaviour is 
reasonable or not, that is, (i) the probability of an accident caused by the rescuer’s behaviour; (ii) the gravity of 
the threatened injury; (iii) the cost of eliminating the risk; and the social utility of the rescuer’s conduct. 
151 Indiana Code §34-30-12-1 s1 (b) “a person who comes upon the scene of an emergency or accident…and in 
good faith, gratuitously renders emergency care … is immune from civil liability…; except for acts or omissions 
amounting to gross negligence.”  
152 Shanghai's long-awaited Good Samaritan Law was adopted on 29 July and went into effect on 1 November 
2016.   
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first aid, but strongly encourage calling the Emergency Hotline 120 in the first instance.153 
Both laws provide effective flexibility with an aim to relieve citizens’ fear of liability, and 
incentivise them to behave altruistically. After all, China’s legal system embodies a 
combination of moralism and law.154 It is bound to be a long-standing systematic mission to 
cultivate spirit of “Good Samaritan”. Any hasty premature legal reform may produce 
counterproductive effect.  
 
 Conclusion  
The interpersonal trust crisis could deteriorate without legal support. China’s dramatic 
changes in social conditions legitimates aligning legal obligations with moral expectations. It 
is the right time to introduce a national Good Samaritan law to counteract the moral apathy 
which is so prevalent in China. A duty to rescue is generally incompatible with individualistic 
values, which, as discussed, is at the heart of the common law. Collectivism, rather than 
individualism, is preferable in China. The social and legal context in China makes it possible 
to introduce a civil law version of a Good Samaritan law. It is thus imperative for a moral 
duty to be embodied in the national law, while protecting people who assist others in 
emergency situations from being falsely accused. New legislation should protect rescuers 
from legal liability for the harm suffered by a rescued victim. The primary legislative intent 
should be to shield the innocent from extortion. The new law can achieve this by penalising 
those who make false accusations, and by rewarding witnesses who provide reliable 
testimonies. In the long run, having a legally enforceable duty will help to deter such false 
                                                          
153 Beijing Good Samaritan Law (effective on 1 March 2017) Article 44  
154 Percy R. Luney Jr, ‘Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China and Japan’ (1989) 52 (2) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 129, 150 
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accusations. Furthermore, it is vital to address the deep-rooted and systematic issues which 
underscore Good Samaritan laws. This includes addressing institutional perspectives. China 
should foster a civil society, as well as promoting a reliable judiciary and effective 
surveillance system, in order to respond to the rapidly transforming society. Until the 
public’s trust is restored in the judicial system, there is a long way to go before the proposed 
Good Samaritan law can have a real transformative effect on the public’s morality. 
